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ABSTRACT: This article discusses the dynamics of charismatic religious movements 
through the case of the qigong craze, which was the largest mass spiritual/religious movement 
in urban China in the 1980s and 1990s, until the banning of Falun Gong in 1999. Charisma 
can be apprehended at three levels: as the embodied experience of individuals; as the 
emotional affect between masters and followers; and as a collective movement within a 
macro-social context. This article examines the articulation between these three dimensions 
of the charismatic phenomenon, tracing how, through breathing and meditation exercises, 
the masters teaching them and the organizations promoting them, charismatic experiences 
could be generated within and between millions of individual bodies and articulated with 
utopian expectations at a specific juncture of modern Chinese history. The emic notion of qi 
as an objectified power that can be experienced, manipulated, and produced is discussed, 
showing how it both facilitated the emergence of charisma but prevented its consolidation, 
leading groups based on qi experiences towards post-charismatic outcomes of 
commodification, radicalization or traditionalization.  
 
 
 
The qigong movement was the most prevalent form of urban religiosity in the People’s Republic 
of China during the last two decades of the twentieth century. During this period, tens, if not 
hundreds, of millions of Chinese practiced qigong gymnastic, breathing and meditation techniques 
taught by thousands of self-proclaimed qigong masters whose networks of followers became the 
largest popular organizations outside the Chinese Communist Party—the best-known, but not the 
only one, of which was Falun Gong. This article focuses on the modalities of how charismatic 
experiences between individual bodies could be generated by mass organizations and articulated with 
utopian expectations at a specific juncture of modern Chinese history. 1  How are individual, 
subjective bodily experiences linked to historical changes at a macro-social level, creating a mass 
movement? I propose that the dynamics of charisma are the key to understanding the link between 
individual subjectivity and broader social process.  
Following Ji Zhe’s contribution in this issue, we may look at charismatic relationships in terms 
of three analytical categories: the expectation of the realization of utopian hopes among followers, the 
emotional affect between the followers and the leader who incarnates the imminent realization of 
their expectations of the extraordinary, and the responsibility of the leader, who, in order to sustain the 
relationship, must be responsive to followers’ needs and confirm their expectations. As discussed in 
Feuchtwang and Goossaert’s contributions in this issue, the leader’s responsiveness is tested and 
confirmed through extraordinary deeds: self-sacrifice for his or her followers, and the ability to 
“move gods and/or men to react (ganying)” to his or her entreaties and commands. Charismatic 
relationships thus involve a circular exchange of responsiveness, in which the leader confirms the 
utopian expectations of the followers, who then confirm the extraordinary power by offering him or 
her their voluntary acquiescence. Based on such a Maussian “gift exchange,” 2  charismatic 
relationships cannot come into existence if expectations are absent among potential followers or if 
individuals seen as endowed with extraordinary powers do not respond to expectations.3 Likewise, 
once they come into existence, charismatic relationships are fraught with tension and inherently 
unstable: either they move in an upward spiral, with expectations of the extraordinary repeatedly 
amplified and confirmed, or their mobilizing capacity dissipates, when the leader is perceived as 
unable to confirm expectations, or if the expectations themselves change. In this article, then, I 
propose to define charisma as a relationship based on the expectation of the extraordinary, which stimulates and 
empowers collective behavior.  
While expectations of the extraordinary may well exist in a culture, diffused within mythological 
narratives or ideologies, it is the incarnation within a single person of the realization of these 
expectations which brings them to life, gives them a human expression, induces the emotional 
responses characteristic of an intensely personalized relationship, orients the action of the 
participants, and becomes a focal point of collective behavior. Put this way, charisma can erupt 
when particular individuals come to incarnate commonly shared expectations of the extraordinary—
be they traditional expectations of a messianic or millenarian type, or modern promises of futuristic 
wonders. What we see in the post-Mao qigong movement is an instance in which masters incarnated 
the realization of both at the same time. It is at the moment when what is a commonly shared 
distant dream or fear suddenly appears on the verge of imminent realization, centered on one person 
or a small handful of individuals, that the collective excitement of a charismatic movement erupts.  
 
LOCAL EXPERIENCES OF QI 
 
In May 1993, only weeks into my first stay in China, I was invited to a lecture on “Qigong 
science” at the Natural Gas Transportation Division of the Sichuan Petroleum Administration.4 The 
Division was a self-contained work-unit (danwei) located on a hill surrounded by rice paddies and 
connected to Chengdu, some 20 km distant, by a winding road which passed through hillocks and 
valleys, used mostly by farmers carting their produce to town on heavy baskets suspended from the 
rear of their bicycles. Commanding this pastoral landscape stood the Division—rows of ageless 
concrete edifices along a single street, housing the administrative offices, the residential units, the 
shops, the schools, and the leisure facilities of its two thousand employees and their families.  
The lecture took place in the Division’s cinema, a large, bare hall with propaganda slogans 
hanging on the walls—“Persist in the Reforms and Opening Up,” “Strengthen the application of the 
spirit of the 14th Party Congress,” and so on. About one hundred people, male employees in their 
synthetic shirts and pants with keychains hanging from their belts, women in black stretch bootstrap 
stockings and flowery tops, and some quiet children, had come to listen to the lecture, filling about 
half the seats of the cinema. Two middle-aged men wearing Western business suits sat on the stage: 
they were the “qigong masters,” qigongshi. The older of the two sat silently on a chair, his hands on his 
laps, while the second delivered a long-winded speech during which he occasionally seemed to grasp 
air with his hands.  
After about ten minutes, a woman in the audience fell into fits of uncontrollable shaking, 
followed by several others in attendance. A third of the audience broke into a cacophony of burps, 
yawns and cries, which continued for some twenty minutes, while the children hilariously imitated 
the grown-ups. Accompanying me out at the end of the session, Mr. Liu, an engineer in the 
Karamay Oilfield in Xinjiang who had been sent to the Division for training at its Petroleum Cadres’ 
College, excitedly exclaimed that the back pains he had been suffering from were now cured!  
I had just witnessed a “power-inducing scientific lecture” (daigong kexue baogaohui), a type of event 
at which qigong masters emitted energy or qi while lecturing on the scientific principles of qigong, in 
order to induce healing and paranormal abilities among audience members. Such lectures had first 
appeared about five years earlier as part of the qigong wave which was gripping China at the time. 
The event I had witnessed, in a suburban work unit and led by relatively unknown masters, was 
child’s play compared to the mass qigong lectures which had electrified the people of Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou in the previous few years, where “star” masters such as Yan Xin (b. 1950) 
and Zhang Hongbao (1954-2006) filled sports stadiums with thousands of the enthusiastic, the sick 
and the curious. In the notorious case of Yan Xin, the power-inducing lectures lasted eight to ten 
hours without breaks or interruptions, while avid meditators stood still on their seats, breathing 
deeply, backs upright, hands on their laps facing upward to receive the master’s qi, while others 
rolled to the ground in a trance and paraplegics stood up from their wheelchairs.  
Far from those stadiums at the Natural Gas Division, I was shaken out of my slumber every 
morning at 6:30 a.m. by the Morning Program which blasted out of the Division loudspeakers until 
eight o’clock—a shrill auditory grind that included, besides news reports from China People’s Radio 
and local announcements, the commands for the standardized nationwide calisthenics routine—Yi! 
Er! San! Si! Wu! Liu! Qi! Ba! But the group of six or seven old ladies who gathered outside my 
stairwell to exercise, and whom I walked past each morning with my enameled metal bowl to collect 
my ration of hot cow’s milk and fried dough sticks, were not doing calisthenics but “fragrant qigong” 
(xianggong), standing, raising and lowering their arms, loosely shaking their palms over their heads, 
faces, chest and abdomen, purifying their bodies of negative qi and, they claimed, producing 
fragrances. Though I never smelled anything when I passed this particular group of ladies, I did feel 
things when I later started practicing qigong myself.  
As an English teacher at the Cadres’ School, my students were engineers who hailed from 
petroleum units in the deserts of Xinjiang, the refineries of Daqing and the gas fields of Sichuan, and 
are now likely using the language skills I taught them in the Chinese oil ventures in Sudan, Gabon 
and Venezuela. One of them, Mr. Xu, was the disciple of a qigong master, Celestial Imprint (Tianyin), 
and organized a group to practice his method, the Power of the Nine Resonances (Jiuying shengong), in the 
Division’s basketball field each morning. I joined this group of 25 middle-aged geologists, engineers 
and accountants, men and women intellectuals who had spent the prime of their youth as Mao’s 
sent-down youth in the countryside. They were eager to make up, through intensive study and an 
insatiable curiosity about the world, for their lost years of schooling during the Cultural Revolution. 
For them, official slogans about “reforming and opening up to the world” had a deep personal 
meaning in relation to their own trajectories of discovering new knowledge from abroad, new 
approaches to doing things, and constantly questioning the revolutionary dogma in which they had 
been indoctrinated during their youth—while technologies such as television, modern home 
appliances, elevators, karaoke and disco lights were propelling them, in the space of a few short 
years, from the steam-train era of the industrial revolution to the consumerism and information 
celebration of late modernity. This “opening up” revealed endless, exciting possibilities to them—
possibilities in stark contrast to the drab reality of their lives in self-contained work units, in which 
opportunities were few and achieving any aim depended on complex, and exhausting, manipulations 
of webs of personal connections.5  
Having grown up in the Mao years and living in the totally secularized environment of the work-
unit, they also had little direct exposure to China’s religious traditions. As intellectuals, most were 
intimately familiar with the characters of the Dream of the Red Chamber6 and of the magical exploits of 
Monkey in the Journey to the West7—which had been serialized on TV a few years earlier. Hong Kong 
kung fu films, which were all the rage in the cinemas and aired each night on TV, were populated 
with Daoist wizards, Buddhist sages, and extraordinary virtuosos of the body. These novels and 
films opened an imaginary, fantasy world in which anything was possible and all physical limitations 
disappeared.  
When I asked them about qigong, they would ask me if I believed in it—a question that always 
threw me off, and still does, because wasn’t qigong just a set of exercises? Believers excitedly cited the 
famous master Yan Xin, who had, by emitting qi, put out a huge fire in the boreal forests of 
Daxing’anling in Northeast China, and had conducted laboratory experiments in which he had 
transformed the molecular structure of water by emitting qi from a distance of 2000 km. And they 
recounted endless cases of people they knew—or themselves—who had been healed of incurable 
illnesses through qigong. To “believe” in qigong and in its “extraordinary powers” (teyi gongneng), then, 
was to believe that anything was possible, that qigong masters, if not potentially anybody, could break 
beyond the limitations of the ordinary world.  
 Belief wasn’t necessary to practice the exercises, however, and the group, composed of believers, 
skeptics, and all intermediary shades of opinion or lack thereof, assembled in rows every morning at 
6:30 a.m. at the basketball field, where Xu taught us the qigong method’s set of nine movements. 
After a few days, when we were able to complete the postures without watching him, he would walk 
between us, scanning his hands over parts of the practitioners’ bodies, sometimes making 
movements as if to expel negative energies and send us qi—which I could distinctly feel as tingling 
“clouds” passing through my body.  
To me, the feeling was slightly nauseating. Nonetheless, for someone to be able to produce such 
a sensation in me, without physical contact, was a mind-blowing experience, shattering my 
understanding of the nature of reality. For others in the group, though not all—some felt nothing 
while others were highly sensitive—the reaction was similar. A new world suddenly opened up to us, 
one which seemed to operate according to laws radically different from the ones we had learned in 
all the materialist education we had received. Discovering this reality triggered an intense desire to 
know and to explore more—a curiosity which was further stimulated by the strong sense of energy, 
vigor, and power that many of us felt after a few weeks of practice, and the ability we acquired to 
mentally feel qi, to stimulate and direct its circulation within the body, and then to project it 
outwards.  
The practitioners felt and discussed unusual bodily experiences among themselves and with Xu 
that included a feeling of heat, of tingling, of a “current” in the hands and fingertips, as well as in the 
lower abdomen; short headaches; penile erection and increase in sexual appetite; an increase in 
mental activity; the feeling of becoming a giant, the head constantly rising; a slight tingling in any 
part of the body toward which the fingers were pointed; a light pain in any part of the body touched 
by the hands; a feeling of heat or coolness emanating from the palms; burping and flatulence; the 
feeling of a current of qi emitted by the palms; the feeling of creating a “ball of qi” by holding the 
two palms facing each other, which could be increased in size or shrunk by moving the palms closer 
or farther apart; a feeling of immobility of the body, a loss of control over the limbs; “currents” 
moving up the spine into the head, and which could be mentally directed toward any part of the 
body; flashes of light perceived when the eyes were closed; deep respiration; and slowing down of 
the rhythm of breathing.  
The method taught by Mr. Xu claimed that no effort of concentration was needed, that one 
could practice it any time, even while watching TV, in contrast to other methods which involved 
meditation and mental training, which were reputed to trigger, among some qigong practitioners, a 
pathological fascination called zouhuo rumo. Indeed, these deep breathing and visualization techniques 
could trigger mystical visions and peak experiences, heightened sensitivity, a melting of the 
boundaries between self and other and a blurring of the distinction between imagination and 
external reality, and a sense of being able to act on the world through mental action alone.8  
Bursting with energy, I, too, began to feel that anything was possible, that with further training I 
could accomplish anything by dancing with this mysterious power. How I came to the conclusion 
that such fantasies, whether true or false, present the spiritual danger of a hypertrophy of the ego, is 
another story which I will not recount here. Certainly, nothing held back my friend Bai, a 23-year-
old teacher at the Division’s primary school. He and his wife attended a week-long training retreat of 
the Zhonggong movement, the largest qigong organization at the time, claiming 30 million adherents. 
It was headquartered in a reconverted army bunker behind Mt. Qingcheng, just west of Chengdu, 
famous as the birthplace of Daoism. At the Zhonggong headquarters, a few miles from the Lord 
Lao pavilion with its statue of Laozi riding a black ox, followers could absorb the master’s qi by 
laying their hands on his first car. At this retreat, Bai had learned to make his fingers longer through 
the power of his concentration, while his wife’s nearsightedness was cured, and she threw away her 
eyeglasses. The couple were bursting with excitement when they recounted their experiences to me 
over a steamy and spicy hot pot. And they proudly wore the pendants they had bought at the retreat, 
bearing a holographic image of the master, the youthful Zhang Hongbao, sitting in the lotus position 
in a Western suit, his hair oiled and slicked to the back.  
Bai now plunged into all branches of knowledge, from Chinese philosophy to Christianity and 
world history, sleeping only three hours a day, in weeks transformed from an earnest small-town 
teacher into a man of knowledge, confidently expounding his theories and explanations on 
everything from the origin of the universe to the interpretation of the Bible. Other Division 
residents began to visit him in his dormitory room to seek advice on problems of health and life. He 
began healing, sending qi to his visitors and to patients who called him by telephone. He began to 
see himself as in the same league as Buddha and Jesus, and to train his pupils to receive American 
TV signals merely by leaning back and looking at the ceiling.  
Bai clearly went over the top, and most practitioners didn’t follow his path, but his experience 
was still significant because it was enthusiasts like him who were the movers and shakers of qigong at 
the grassroots level, and often grew into the role of qigong masters. Bai himself did not succeed, 
however: a few months later he moved to a coastal city to become a manager in his uncle’s business, 
where qigong was of little help to him. He later returned to Chengdu as a self-employed entrepreneur 
in the information technology field, interested in religion and spirituality but no longer practicing 
qigong.  
These ethnographic vignettes can give us an idea of the qigong movement at a grassroots danwei. 
Everybody knew about it, on any given morning one could find, at different spots in the danwei, 
between two to four practice groups of different methods, formed by enthusiastic individuals, which 
would go on for a few months then peter off, until someone else came along with a new method. 
People went to the healing lectures and watched a documentary series on qigong on TV, showcasing 
the extraordinary powers of the grandmasters. At the Division Party Secretary’s home, I spotted on 
the tea table the bestselling book The Great Qigong Master Comes Out of the Mountains, a hagiographic 
account of the miracles of grandmaster Zhang Hongbao. Some practiced a method for a while then 
gradually gave up because they couldn’t get up so early in the morning, or were too busy, or the 
curiosity wore out. Others found their health problems improve or their illnesses cured, and their 
stories circulated in the local gossip, and they persevered in their practice. But the most assiduous 
were older people, for whom nurturing health was the highest priority, and regular daily exercises in 
small groups were also a good time to socialize.  
What signs of charisma can be seen in these vignettes? Many people practiced qigong, in various 
degrees of intensity, for various periods of time, with unstable levels of enthusiasm. Few were 
personally involved in a charismatic relationship. Of those I have described, only Xu, and a 
classmate of his, was a follower of Celestial Imprint, and Bai and his wife were followers of Zhang 
Hongbao. Both Xu and Bai animated qigong practice and healing activities in the Division, in which 
scores of less committed residents participated. The enthusiasm of people like Xu and Bai, though a 
small minority, had a significant impact, in that it helped to disseminate qigong experiences to a large 
proportion of Division residents. Indeed, qi experiences created the soil out of which charismatic 
relationships could grow. They were often experienced as something “extraordinary,” and could be 
linked by association with expectations (or the imagination of) the extraordinary which were present 
in the popular culture of China at the time—from magical fantasies associated with mythical figures 
and kung fu movies, to utopian visions of technological modernity. Miraculous tales of qigong 
grandmasters such as Yan Xin provided confirmation that such hopes and expectations were within 
reach, and many, though they didn’t become followers of a single master, did “believe” in qigong, 
opening what we could call a collective charismatic field of masters and practitioners. Within this 
field, Bai, by taking a course in Zhang Hongbao’s method, had qi experiences which were directly 
linked to a single master. Even though he had never met him in person, Bai attributed to him, 
through his method, the extraordinary ability to lengthen one’s finger or cure nearsightedness. For 
Bai and his wife, Zhang Hongbao incarnated the extraordinary expectations which had been fanned 
by the qigong movement through qi experiences. And yet, Bai’s charismatic relationship with Zhang 
Hongbao was short-lived, since he soon came to see himself as having equivalent powers, and, 
thanks to his own healing abilities, began to acquire a charismatic following of his own in the 
Division.  
 
POWER AND CHARISMA 
 
Qi experience was clearly an important factor in the emergence and nurturing of charisma. The 
interest of qigong in relation to charisma lies in its embodiment of the extraordinary through what the 
actors themselves describe as the experience and circulation of a mystic power called qi between 
masters and their followers. This power is the subject of highly elaborate emic discourses and 
theories, which name the power, describe its operation, and indicate how to manipulate and control 
it. Associated with these theories are sets of body, breathing and mental exercises which produce 
embodied experiences of this power. Because the power is experienced viscerally—literally so, the 
lower abdomen being the vortex of this power in the body—it is more than, or other than, abstract 
faith or belief; and because it is understood as circulating between masters and practitioners, it 
produces a visceral, embodied relationship between them, creating a very special type of charismatic 
bond. Qi experiences can thus trigger and enhance charismatic relationships. On the other hand, 
because the power is so strongly objectified, and seen as universal and accessible to anyone who 
practices the exercises, it ultimately undermines the authority of masters whose charisma rests solely 
on their qi, and empowers individual practitioners who may work with it independently of a master, 
and indeed opens the possibility for anyone—indeed, everyone—to have access to it.  
The qigong master is a peculiar type of charismatic figure: in the case of individuals with the 
ability to project qi to others, creating an “energy field” of mutual responsiveness between 
themselves and multitudes of followers, we can speak of a “somatized” charisma which is felt in the 
bodily sensations of flows of qi and healing experiences.9 In notions of qi, we find indigenous 
concepts which, in a way, specify a particular type of charisma, which is conceived of in a virtually, 
and often explicitly, material sense, as a substance or force which circulates and can be physically 
experienced. Furthermore, while the etymology of the term charisma evokes a gift which is 
mysteriously restricted to the “elect” or, by secular extension, to the “genius” or the “virtuoso,” in qi 
we find a power which is understood as potentially nurtured, cultivated, manipulated, even circulated 
at will by anyone who undergoes qigong training. Since qi is seen as being present everywhere in the 
universe, requiring only a specific form of technical training to be harnessed, it becomes conceivable 
to develop increasingly rationalized and efficient technologies of the body to make this power 
accessible in the largest possible quantity to the largest number of people. Qi thus became both the 
source of the grandmasters’ charisma, and the object of rationalized extraction and exploitation 
under the rubric of “somatic science”—making “extraordinary” powers accessible to ordinary 
people practicing very ordinary sets of exercises.  
Qigong is described by practitioners primarily in terms of immediate experience, one which is felt 
directly in the body; these experiences are a crucial component of the charismatic phenomenon. It is 
not my purpose to define what these experiences are in physiological terms, nor to explain their 
mechanisms. What is important here is that the practice of qigong produces such types of experiences, 
and since most practitioners have no previous experiences of such types of experiences before 
practicing, they feel them as something special or extraordinary and specific to qigong. And precisely 
because they usually do not have prior experience of such phenomena, they will tend to adopt qigong 
cosmologies and discourses to understand and describe their experiences, inscribing themselves 
within the cosmology and concepts of qigong.  
Qi experiences can be felt by any person who practices qigong exercises. Some may experience 
such sensations immediately, others only after a long period of sustained practice, and others not at 
all. The exercises provide the means for willfully triggering and controlling such experiences, so that 
one acquires the ability to become aware of qi, to increase its sensation, to mentally direct and 
control its flows, both within and outside the body. As such, there is nothing intrinsically charismatic 
about them, since they can be produced alone by virtually anyone, merely by following technical 
instructions, without the presence of a master.  
However, such experiences can be induced even more powerfully through group practice. 
Phenomena such as burping, swaying and spontaneous movements appear to be contagious and 
triggered more easily in a group setting, which creates what is emically termed a “field of qi” (qichang) 
which facilitates the flow of energy and its appearance among practitioners. This was often 
reinforced through atmosphere-setting devices such as playing tapes of relaxing music or of lectures 
by a master. In practice groups in which I participated, it was also common for trainers to circulate 
among practitioners who were doing their standing exercises, and to emit qi toward them as they 
passed by.  
Experiences of qi can be even more powerfully induced when the technical instructions are 
combined with qi-emission by a master in a group setting (or by playing an audio or videotape of the 
master, said to contain qi-filled “messages” xinxi). Typically, instructions on how to sit, to breathe, 
relax, and so on are combined with theoretical disquisitions on qigong science, accounts of healing 
through qigong, and other educational information. In this case the “field of qi” is orchestrated by a 
master, in person or through audio or video tape, who is seen as a virtuoso in qigong. The qi 
sensations felt by the practitioners are understood as occurring as a direct result of the power of the 
master himself or herself, through the emission of qi. The stage is thus set for the emergence of a 
charismatic relationship: the bodily experiences of the audience are felt as confirmations of the 
master’s extraordinary powers; the master is seen as an exemplary virtuoso, a model of 
accomplishment in qigong practice. Charisma is thus generated and confirmed through bodily 
experience.  
The objectification of qi further makes it possible to imagine and implement its scientific and 
rationalized production in the context of modern, bureaucratic organizations: identify the somatic 
manifestations of qi, increase efficiency in the production and control of qi by designing body 
cultivation technologies to that end, by isolating and refining traditional techniques, create an 
apparatus for the mass dissemination of these techniques to as many people as possible in the 
shortest possible period of time. This project of rationalization could appeal to both masters seeking 
to create mass followings, and to state agents excited by the prospect of turning “gems of Chinese 
tradition” into modern instruments for spreading health to the masses, and even into a revolutionary 
science which could propel China and the world into the utopia of human omnipotence.  
 Through the transmission networks established by hundreds of the masters in the 1980s and 
1990s, qi experiences were indeed generated on a massive scale. These networks followed a relatively 
homogenous model of organization and transmission, linking the master and his core followers to 
the mass of practitioners throughout the country and abroad. At the grassroots, local practice 
points—such as those described in the ethnographic vignettes above—situated at specific spots in 
parks and public spaces, offered free exercise sessions led by volunteers in the mornings and 
evenings. These volunteers were coordinated by local branches at the regional or municipal level. 
They dealt with local state-sponsored qigong associations and government authorities, ensured the 
smooth running of practice points within a specified jurisdiction, and organized fee-charging training 
workshops at which one could learn the beginning and intermediary levels of the master’s method. 
Capable and enthusiastic participants in these workshops would then be chosen to lead practice 
points and teach the basic postures of the method. Higher-level training was normally provided only 
by the master in person. At this level of training, which often included management techniques, 
leading members of the organization were recruited. The central organization, which directed the 
overall expansion of the network, was controlled by the master, either officially as president, or 
behind the scenes with close disciples acting as officers, and was usually affiliated to a state-
sponsored qigong association. The qigong masters could thus build massive transmission networks to 
generate qi experiences among millions of practitioners at thousands of practice points all over 
China and even overseas. It was on the basis of these experiences, and along these networks, that 
charismatic relationships could be established.  
But, at the same time, these networks and qi experiences were not sufficient for masters to 
generate and sustain charisma. It was not enough to create and to teach a qigong method to millions. 
Qigong masters were a group of mostly middle-aged men, of ordinary status in society, marginal vis-à-
vis both traditional and modern institutions.10 The role of qigong master, however, required that they 
be supermen, holders of a mystic force inherited from secret traditions going back to high antiquity, 
and transmitters of a path of utopian realization for humanity. How could they come to be identified 
with such an image? The career of the qigong master was a process of creating a public persona 
surrounded by a legend, until s/he came to be naturally and unconsciously perceived as an 
incarnation of cultural expectations. The essential factor in the emergence of the master was the 
public aura: the identity between the master and the mythical figure had to be convincing and not 
artificial. She or he had to cultivate an image of a “true” qigong master and not of a charlatan, in a 
context where “phonies” were increasingly numerous. The status of “qigong master” was never 
objectively acquired nor universally recognized: it was the subject of a perpetual struggle. I have 
discussed elsewhere the ingredients which need to be combined and played up for a master to 
acquire charisma;11 these correspond to the four “idioms” listed by Goossaert in this issue as 
typically conjoined by one person in charismatic relationships in China: (1) miraculous or healing 
powers deriving from virtuosity in self-cultivation; (2) mastery of scholarship and knowledge 
expressed in the idiom of science; (3) connection to tradition through claims to discipleship and 
genealogy; and (4) moral leadership accruing from self-sacrifice and virtue. Thus, while qi 
experiences could enhance expectations of the extraordinary, masters were expected to confirm their 
status through recourse to a combination of those four idioms.  
 
THE MACRO-SOCIAL CONTEXT AND HISTORICAL JUNCTURE 
  
In the previous section, I focused on technical operations: how qi experiences can be induced 
and controlled through sets of body exercises, and how they can stimulate and reinforce affect 
between a master and practitioners; how masters acquire the aura that enables them to incarnate the 
realization of extraordinary expectations; and how these sets of exercises, this image, and this bond 
can be replicated among millions of practitioners anywhere in the world. All of these elements can 
be rationalized and constantly refined to produce higher efficiency and impact. In the qigong 
movement, then, it would appear as if we could identify all of the necessary ingredients for the 
rationalized manufacture of charisma on a massive scale.  
Indeed, it would be safe to estimate that at least one-fifth of China’s urban population—well 
over 100 million people—was directly exposed to qigong during the 1980s or 1990s, either attending 
healing lectures or practicing qigong gymnastic and breathing exercises in parks and public spaces. 
This phenomenon, called qigong fever by commentators at the time, which began in the late 1970s and 
came to an end with the state’s suppression of Falun Gong in 1999, was the largest mass cultural, 
social, and religious movement in urban post-Mao China. In the years immediately following the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the health authorities of the new state 
attempted to secularize traditional body cultivation techniques and to institutionalize them as a 
discipline of the modernized “Chinese medicine,” under the category of qigong.12 Initially practiced in 
sanatoria and clinics for the party elite, modern qigong was banned during the Cultural Revolution but 
re-appeared in the late 1970s, as a form of mass exercise practiced in parks, which acquired a new 
legitimation not only as a branch of medicine, but also as the foundation of a new science which 
could develop paranormal abilities or “extraordinary powers” and usher a new scientific revolution. 
With the support of leading members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and scientific 
institutions, thousands of qigong practice networks led by entrepreneurial masters blossomed 
throughout the 1980s. The repertoire of practices expanded to include techniques that induced 
trance states of “spontaneous movements” (zifa donggong), glossolalia or “cosmic language” (yuzhou 
yu), divination, and mass qi-emitting healing sessions, while some masters became national celebrities 
who could easily draw thousands to their healing lectures. Sensational healing stories and accounts 
of miracles performed by qigong masters were widely reported in the media, fanning the “fever,” 
while state-sponsored national federations attempted to coordinate the movement into a single 
constituency.  
Qigong fever was one of the countless cultural crazes which swept post-Mao China in the 1980s 
and 1990s, ranging from “culture fever” to “Mao fever” to “stock market fever.” The fever (re) can 
be situated somewhere between the political campaigns or movements (yundong) of the Mao era, and 
the consumer fads of capitalist societies. A fever is a form of collective effervescence in China’s 
post-totalitarian phase which occurs when official policies and informal signals sent from above 
correspond with, open the space for, and amplify popular desire, which appropriates these spaces in 
unexpected ways, simultaneously complying with, disrupting, and mirroring the projects of state 
hegemony. Thus, in qigong, the official campaign to promote science and technology as the 
foundation of Deng’s Four Modernizations, was enthusiastically taken up by the qigong milieu and 
recast as a call to encourage the mass propagation of breathing exercises as a stage in China’s cultural 
and scientific renaissance. As “moments when an entire cultural area (often all of urban China, 
sometimes the nation as a whole) is unified by a common activity,” as described by Ellen Hertz,13 
fevers create a social sphere in which all the actors operate within the roughly corresponding spatial 
and temporal frames of the nation and its historicity.  
By the early 1990s, many masters began to consolidate their networks by building large 
nationwide organizations, while issues of the commercialization, traditional authenticity, and 
scientific validity became the subject of heated debates both in the press and within qigong circles. 
From the mid-1990s, political support for qigong had dissipated, and the qigong movement fell into 
disarray. One of the masters, Li Hongzhi, rejected qigong and developed his method of Falun Gong 
into a system of belief and practice that added a strongly moralistic message of universal salvation 
with apocalyptic undertones to the healing dimension of the body exercises—all expounded in a 
sacred scripture, Zhuan Falun (Turning the Dharma Wheel).14 This more fundamentalist movement grew 
rapidly, drawing millions of followers, and came into increasing tension with the Chinese state. In 
addition, the Chinese media grew more critical of Falun Gong; followers responded by staging sit-
ins and demonstrations around newspaper and television offices, and ultimately, on 25 April 1999, 
by mobilizing more than 10,000 followers around the Zhongnanhai headquarters of the Chinese 
Communist Party—the largest popular protest in China since the 1989 Tiananmen student 
movement. The CCP then outlawed Falun Gong and launched a ruthless repression campaign to 
exterminate the movement, which continues to this day. Most other qigong groups were also 
disbanded and, while qigong is still practiced today in Chinese parks, only five standardized sets of 
exercises can be taught, by trainers certified by the State Sports Administration.  
Qigong as a mass movement was thus an ephemeral social phenomenon. Although hundreds of 
qigong masters, including the most famous and charismatic of them, emigrated to Taiwan, Australia, 
Canada, the United States and Europe, contributing to the growing popularity of qigong in those 
countries, none of these places has experienced anything even remotely approximating the 
magnitude of the fever which had gripped mainland China. While masters such as Yan Xin and, 
especially, Li Hongzhi, built a devoted following overseas, attesting to their charisma, nonetheless, 
their appeal has remained limited, even among the overseas Chinese.  
It is to the macro-social environment, then, that we must turn to understand why qigong became 
so “hot” in China and not elsewhere. There are several immediate factors to consider, one of which 
is that by virtue of the sheer size of China’s population and the high level of integration of Chinese 
society, any fad or mass phenomenon easily grows exponentially, reverberating on itself and 
producing a high social impact. Another factor was the absence of alternatives in a tightly regulated 
religious field. In such a context, reinforced by both traditional collectivism and socialist 
standardization, the most important factors in my view are (1) the secularization of post-Mao 
Chinese society, which paradoxically increased the “extraordinariness” of qi experiences and qigong 
masters; and (2) the strong presence of utopian expectations in the culture, that could be amplified 
by qi experiences and masters. It was when qigong was experienced as extraordinary and connected 
with utopian expectations that qigong masters could incarnate the hope of an imminent realization 
and produce an explosion of charisma.  
As defined by Feuchtwang and Wang, “Charisma is the expectation of the extraordinary. It is the 
expectation of finding an agency through which a turn of fortune towards utopia will be brought 
about in historical time.”15 New forms of charisma thus proliferate in modern times, in which 
expectations of the extraordinary, in the form of deliverance from illness and poverty, are given 
expression through modern utopias, bureaucracies, and medical advances. Following this reasoning, 
faith in science and scientific institutions can generate charismatic expectations when they can be 
incarnated in the figure of a single person. This was precisely accomplished in the qigong movement, 
when famous masters were labeled as life scientists, their healing lectures as scientific experiments, 
and their methods as forms of scholarly activity. Qigong masters could incarnate the charismatic 
expectations of scientism, and practicing qigong as a form of science allowed the practitioner to utilize, 
and manipulate, the powers of science.  
Because qi experiences are palpably felt by the practitioners, they can be understood as quite real, 
physical, and true in a material sense, while at the same time the experiences are understood as being 
“out of the ordinary” and reinforce the masters’ charisma as supermen (chaoren) and align them with 
traditional images of extraordinary power, such as those of the shenyi (miracle doctor), the shenxian 
(Daoist immortal), the huo pusa (living Buddha), the fashi (master of religious and magical arts), and 
the zongshi (lineage patriarch). Qi experiences, then, can trigger, strengthen, and validate charismatic 
expectations already present in the culture.  
The saliency of these experiences is amplified by the scientism and secularism of political and 
cultural orthodoxy: because there is no way to conceive of or explain such experiences in the 
dominant worldview, they become even more extraordinary than within a traditional cosmology 
which assumes the naturalness of such experiences and phenomena. At the same time, because the 
experiences are physical and can be felt by just about anyone, they appear to be universal material 
phenomena, expressions of a hitherto-undiscovered natural law compatible with scientism and 
secularism, and thus extraordinary because they seem to constitute the missing link between the 
mystical esotericism of tradition and the universalism of science. The context of scientism and 
secularism thus helps to amplify the charismatic effect of qi experiences.  
Indeed, in qigong the body, as a locus of charismatic power, becomes a site for utopian 
experiences—in which, by entering states of heightened or altered consciousness, the practitioner 
may enter alternative inner worlds which can be correlated to utopian visions and critiques of the 
outer world of mundane life and society. Utopia can here be broadly defined as an imagined “other” 
world in which hopes and desires are realized, be it in the next life or in this world, in the past or in 
the future. Thus understood, utopian thought is the common basis of millennialism, apocalypticism, 
modernism, and communism, and provides a key to understanding, as appears in the story of qigong, 
how traditional body technologies could facilitate shifts from one type of utopia to another in 
socialist China. 
The conflation of a magicalized fantasy of the past with the dreams of utopian scientism, in a 
context of the breakdown of tradition, thus produced the burst of qigong fever in the late eighties. 
What defines qigong in the People’s Republic of China as distinct from both other configurations of 
traditional body technologies, and from other social movements, then, is its alignment of traditional 
expectations of miraculous powers with the unfolding of the utopian project of modernity and 
scientism at every juncture of socialist China’s history, producing the conditions, as defined above, 
for a nationwide charismatic fever.  
Feuchtwang and Wang argue, “Charisma pure and simple is the splitting away from religious 
traditions of their utopian expectations of the extraordinary.”16 It is at moments when more static 
forms of custom fail to meet expectations that charismatic traditions come to the fore. Modernity 
doubly enhances such potentialities, first by widening the gulf between present reality and traditional 
ideals, and second, by intersecting mythical or messianic time with the linear historicity of utopian 
progress. Thus “modern charisma is the joining of traditional expectations of the extraordinary with a sense of time 
as homogenous, empty and secular, producing utopian expectations.”17 
  
OUTCOMES: COMMODIFICATION, RADICALIZATION OR 
TRADITIONALIZATION 
 
Qi experiences thus triggered and reinforced the charismatic expectations embedded in both 
traditional culture and scientism. At the same time, however, the democratic nature of qi 
experiences—which could be attained and felt by anyone—undermined their own charismatic 
potential, turning them from something extraordinary into something quite ordinary, in theory 
accessible to anyone. The ambiguous nature of qi experiences ultimately made the qigong movement 
unsustainable for its main actors. Senior political leaders had been attracted by the universal and 
democratic dimension of the mass dissemination of qigong practices, which fit well with revolutionary 
visions of popular knowledge and mass health. On that basis, they actively promoted the 
rationalization of qigong and its dissemination. But they had not counted on how qigong experiences 
could stimulate and enhance the charisma of masters who ended up with a large following and 
significant organizations independent of the CCP. In spite of all the state’s attempts at rationally 
managing the masters through bureaucratic procedures, it failed, and the state ultimately found the 
existence of this charisma intolerable, withdrew its support for the qigong movement, and ultimately 
attempted to crush what had become the largest group, Falun Gong. 
For qigong groups, however, it was the universal and democratic nature of qigong experiences 
which ultimately became problematic. Although qigong masters fully exploited the rationalization of 
qigong experiences to rapidly gain a mass following, the very universality of qi experiences made it 
impossible to ensure loyalty in an increasingly crowded market of masters providing the same types 
of experiences. Furthermore, rationalizing and commercializing the qi experiences undermined the 
extraordinary and other-worldly character of the qigong masters. It thus became difficult for the 
masters to sustain their followings, and their image was damaged by growing suspicions of quackery.  
As much as qi could serve as an oil to stimulate and lubricate charismatic bonds, it was not 
sufficient to maintain them over the long term, to create something permanent. What Weber called 
the problem of “routinization” posed itself acutely in the qigong movement. Since the qigong 
movement was suddenly aborted in 1999 by the Falun Gong repression, it is impossible to know 
what would have been the natural evolution of the various qigong organizations. But by comparing 
qigong groups and other related Chinese traditions, it appears that three outcomes are possible: 
commodification, moral fundamentalism, or traditionalization.  
By the mid 1990s, many qigong groups had followed the route of commodification, making a 
profitable business of selling courses, books, videotapes, and qi-imbued products. By far the most 
large-scale attempt in this direction was Zhang Hongbao’s Zhonggong, which created several 
business conglomerates, trained its leading followers in MBA courses, and attempted to synthesize 
Confucian, socialist and corporate styles of management.18 For commercialization to work, it was 
necessary to focus on the production and sale of qi experiences as described above; however, 
beyond a certain point, commodification appears incompatible with the charisma expected of a 
master: the mundane expectations of commercial exchange corrode the image of the master’s 
extraordinary self-sacrifice and responsiveness to his followers. None of the masters was able to 
resolve this tension in China. In the West, however, where many of the masters have set up shop, a 
model of pure commodification prevails in the market for alternative therapies and spiritualities. In 
my research on the most successful qigong training product in the West, initially marketed by Mantak 
Chia and continued in the U.S. by Michael Winn, I have found hardly any charismatic expectations 
or pretensions: the leading promoters of this product can be called qi technicians and salesmen, and 
make no claims, nor are they seen by their clients, to embody extraordinary powers. It would appear, 
then, that the logical outcome of commodification is the elimination of charisma on the one hand 
and a focus on marketable qi experiences on the other.19  
Another trajectory, followed by Falun Gong, was to condemn commercialization and move in 
the direction of moral fundamentalism. Starting in 1994, two years after he had gone public as a 
qigong master, Li Hongzhi introduced several new elements which transformed the nature of 
charismatic power in his movement. First, he dismissed qi experiences as something of a lower order, 
replacing qi with gong, understood as moral superiority, as the power to be pursued in Falun Gong 
practice. Significantly, gong is described as something which cannot be accumulated or circulated at 
will, but which increases only as a function of personal moral cultivation and with the help of the 
master. By emphasizing gong, Falun Gong thus put itself apart from the competition of myriads of 
groups all working with the same qi, and shifted the source of charisma from extraordinary qi 
experiences to extraordinary moral purity. Secondly, by ceasing to hold training seminars and 
emphasizing instead the study of his book Zhuan Falun as the core element of Falun Gong practice, 
he introduced a sacred scripture which, to a degree, replaced the master’s body as the principal 
vehicle of his power: reading and re-reading the Book became one of the chief means for attaining 
personal transformation and illumination. The result of this and other changes is that, instead of qi 
experiences circulating between the master and followers, the result of Falun Gong cultivation 
becomes defined by moral behavior grounded on the authority of the master’s book, in which his 
living presence becomes less important. However, by shifting the focus to the moral field, charisma 
was preserved and even amplified: the practices, and the master, became the focus of discourses on 
deliverance from the moral corruption of society. Paradoxically, the Chinese state’s repression of 
Falun Gong practitioners served as double confirmations of charisma: by enhancing the image of 
moral innocence and purity of the practitioners, the master and his teachings; and, through 
narratives of resistance to torture, providing confirmations of the extraordinary power of Falun 
Gong.  
The third type of outcome—traditionalization—does not seem to have appeared in mainland 
Chinese qigong groups. For the sake of comparison, however, we can note how this has occurred in 
earlier Chinese movements in which qi experiences have played an important role. In Quanzhen 
Daoism, for instance, the body cultivation techniques of Inner Alchemy were fundamental in the 
early years of the movement, and continue to have an important place in its ideology.20 But today, 
Quanzhen identity is structured by traditional authority based on genealogies of masters; body 
cultivation is optional and qi experiences are secondary.21 A more recent movement founded in the 
1920s, the Tiandejiao (Heavenly Virtues Teaching), can be seen as the prototype of charismatic 
qigong. Its founding master, Xiao Changming (1895-1943), taught a meditation and healing technique, 
called “spiritual healing” (jingshen zhiliao) which involved the emission of qi to patients.22 The huge 
crowds drawn by Xiao and his disciples when they healed for free in city parks were one of the 
factors in his movement being banned by the Guomindang regime in 1937. Although it was one of 
Xiao’s disciples, Bao Guiwen, who re-introduced “external qi” therapy in mainland China in the late 
1970s, contributing to triggering the qigong boom, qi experiences are no longer central to the life of 
Tiandejiao communities in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Instead, Xiao Changming is enshrined as a god 
in Tiandejiao temples. It his iconized body, the memory of his miracles, and his moral teachings 
which are most central to Tiandejiao identity.23 Tiandejiao increasingly resembles a traditional 
Chinese temple cult, in which charisma is transferred to the deity statue.  
  
CONCLUSION 
  
Charisma appears when immediate experience is connected with more distant utopian 
expectations, bringing about the sense of their imminent realization. In the qigong movement, the 
most charismatic masters were those who were able both to trigger embodied experience and, 
through the adroit combination of strands of mythical and utopian imagination, to make that 
connection for masses of people. While utopian expectations may well exist in every culture, their 
expression is historically contingent. Charismatic relationships thus emerge when a leader is able to 
connect unique personal experiences with the hopes arising from a particular moment in the history 
of a singular society. What the case of the qigong movement shows, however, is that such 
relationships need not emerge in a vacuum: a charismatic field can be created through the mass 
production of extraordinary experiences (by the dissemination of qigong techniques) and through the 
amplification of popular utopian hopes (by the circulation of tales of qigong masters and miracles, 
themselves embedded in popular discourses on magic, tradition and science). Such a field became 
the soil out of which charismatic leaders could emerge and build followings, but at the same time, 
the majority of practitioners did not become committed followers of a single master. The 
charismatic field was thus the collective space of a broader social movement—a fever which could 
generate its thousands of masters and its millions of participants, and which would rise and fall with 
shifts in the historical juncture.  
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